Using a new database of the compensation terms, ownership structures (capital commitments), and quarterly cash flows for a large sample of buyout and venture capital private equity funds from 1984-2010, we investigate the determinants of manager compensation and ownership and how these contract terms relate to the funds' cash flow performance. Market conditions during fundraising are an important driver of compensation, as pay rises and shifts to fixed components during fundraising booms. We find no evidence that higher compensation or lower managerial ownership are associated with worse net-of-fee performance, in stark contrast to other asset management settings. Instead, compensation is largely unrelated to net cash flow performance. Our evidence is most consistent with an equilibrium in which compensation terms reflect agency concerns and the productivity of manager skills, and in which managers with higher compensation earn back their pay by delivering higher gross performance.
I. Introduction
In private equity, the agency relationship between fund managers (the general partners, or GPs) and investors (the limited partners, or LPs) is governed by a management contract, signed at the inception of the fund, that specifies the compensation of the GPs and the GPs' own investment in the fund. Because investments in private equity lock up the limited partner's investment capital for long periods of time (up to ten years, sometimes with an option to extend), and because LPs have limited recourse to alternative governance mechanisms, the terms of these management contracts are especially important for providing GPs with appropriate incentives.
As private equity has grown in prominence, the industry's compensation practices and incentive structures have come under increasing scrutiny, both by industry observers and limited partners alike. Some have suggested that the general partners in private equity funds do little to earn their pay, which sometimes amounts to tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars per year, especially when fixed management fees are a substantial component of overall pay.
1 These concerns are especially acute during fundraising booms when fund sizes grow, given the skepticism about whether private equity managers are able to effectively deploy these larger pools of capital. Similarly, some have argued that private equity limited partners are too unsophisticated to understand the management contracts they enter into (Phalippou, 2009) , and consequently general partners can extract excessive terms. It is also often suggested that the GPs' own capital committed to the fund, typically around 1% of the overall fund, inadequately aligns their incentives with those of their investors.
These arguments suggest that funds whose managers are paid more, or those who have little personal stake in the fund, will perform poorly.
These considerations are not unique to private equity. Concerns about whether portfolio managers earn their fees and whether their incentives are adequately aligned with the interests of their investors are central to the economics of any setting in delegated asset management. Despite the large literatures examining related issues for mutual funds and hedge funds, and the growing importance of private equity as an asset class, these concerns have not been directly examined in the private equity setting. This gap in our knowledge is largely due to lack of data. Information on the compensation and ownership structures of private equity funds, and their cash flow performance, is not publicly available.
In this paper, we provide evidence on these issues using a large, proprietary database of buyout and venture capital private equity funds from . The data include the fixed management fees and performance-based carried interest that the GPs earn as compensation, as well as the amount of the GPs' own capital commitment to the fund, which determines their ownership stake. The data also include the complete quarterly cash flows between the funds and their investors (net of management fees and carried interest), extending to the second quarter of 2010. The dataset comprises the largest and most recent sample of private equity compensation terms in the literature, and is the first available for academic research to include information on GP ownership. The dataset is also the first to include cash flows for a large sample of private equity funds raised in the period after 1995, which has seen much of the growth in the industry, to include cash flows extending beyond 2003, and to combine cash flow information with compensation and ownership data. We use the data to contrast two competing explanations of the structure and determinants of management contracts. The first view, laid out above, is that the terms of management contracts are inefficient in that they provide insufficient incentives and allow private equity GPs to charge excessive fees for the performance they deliver. The alternative view is that limited partners are relatively sophisticated investors who understand the long-term nature of the private equity investments and the limited opportunities for alternative governance mechanisms. Under this alternative view, compensation and ownership terms should reflect agency concerns and the expected productivity of GP skills, and higher compensation should be justified by greater ability to generate gross-of-fee returns. This optimal contracting view predicts that compensation will either be unrelated to net-of-fee performance (if managers with higher compensation capture the associated higher gross returns, as in a Berk and Green (2004) type equilibrium), or else positively related to net returns (if some excess returns are shared with LPs). Similarly, if ownership terms are set optimally, managers with lower ownership should not underperform.
Our main findings cast considerable doubt on the view that GP compensation and capital commitments are inefficient, and that LPs are unaware of the implications of the management contracts they enter into. Instead, our evidence is more consistent with an optimal contracting framework in which management contracts reflect agency considerations and the productivity of managerial skills. In particular, we find no evidence that high fee funds, or those with low manager ownership, earn lower net-of-fee performance. These conclusions hold using both the public market equivalent (PME) introduced by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) as well as "tailored PMEs" that replace the S&P 500 index in the PME calculation with benchmark indexes more closely fitted to the funds. Compensation and ownership terms are largely unrelated to these performance measures, and what relations we do find mostly oppose the predictions of the inefficiency view. 3 The general lack of a relation between compensation and net-of-fee performance implies that GPs with higher compensation earn their pay by generating higher gross performance.
Of course, funds with higher compensation could simply be earning higher gross performance by taking on more systematic risk instead of providing excess returns. To test for this, we estimate equations relating capital calls and distributions to public equity price/dividend ratios to ask whether capital is being called/distributed when market expected returns are high are low. If high compensation funds were more likely to call capital when price/dividend ratios were low (i.e., when expected returns are high) and distribute capital when price/dividend ratios were high (i.e., when expected returns are low), this would suggest that part of their excess performance came from higher systematic risk. We find no evidence of this. Indeed, the evidence suggests that it is unlikely that private equity funds with higher compensation and incentives earn back their fees by taking more systematic risk.
Instead, the evidence is more consistent with the interpretation that managers of such funds add more value.
These results hold in spite of the strong evidence we present that market conditions are important determinants of GP compensation, with GPs absorbing more fixed pay on average during periods of strong market conditions. During fundraising booms, the average fund size grows, and controlling for fund size, management fees increase. Carried interest and capital commitments do not move cyclically. These results imply that GP compensation rises and shifts to fixed components during booms, both in absolute terms and as a fraction of fund size, resulting in lower elasticities of GP compensation and wealth to fund performance.
Compensation and incentives also vary in the cross-section of funds. Carried interest is higher in larger funds, while management fees are lower. These findings imply that the elasticity of GP compensation to performance is higher in larger funds, consistent with Gompers and Lerner's (1999) analysis of VC funds. These results are consistent with the idea that higher-ability GPs raise larger funds (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005) and with standard agency arguments that higher-ability managers require stronger incentives. They are also consistent with a trade-off between size and management fees driven by limitations in the scalability of the industry. In buyout funds, ownership patterns reinforce these conclusions.
In VC, lower ownership in larger funds dampens the incentive effects of the higher carried interest. Overall, these results are consistent with the view of Gompers and Lerner (1999),
Axelson, Strömberg, and Weisbach (2009), and others that agency considerations are a key determinant of private equity compensation and the organization of private equity funds more generally.
All told, our evidence favors the optimal contracting view of management contracts.
Higher cost GPs do not underperform net-of-fee, so they earn their higher fees through higher gross returns. This result combined with the fact that GPs obtain higher pay during private equity booms suggests, if anything, that the overall rents to private equity investing are higher during these periods. There is no evidence that GPs with lower ownership stakes-those with less "skin in the game"-earn lower returns, which is inconsistent with the view that such GPs are insufficiently bonded to the fund and have inadequate incentives.
Our work is related to several branches of the literature. Closely related are two earlier papers that study aspects of private equity compensation. Gompers and Lerner (1999) study compensation in a sample of VC funds raised before 1992. Consistent with our results, they find that more reputable VCs earn lower management fees and higher carried interest. They also find that carried interest is unrelated to the VC's stake in IPO companies (a proxy for gross performance), while our evidence implies that funds with higher compensation have higher gross performance. Our analysis differs from theirs in several ways. We study the buyout industry as well, examine how compensation varies with fundraising cycles, including the venture capital and buyout booms and busts of the last two decades, and study managerial ownership in addition to compensation. We also link management fees and ownership, in addition to carried interest, to the exact cash flow performance and call/distribution behavior of the funds. The combination of cash flow data with the terms of the management contract allows for powerful tests that are critical to assessing the optimal contracting view.
Metrick and Yasuda (2010a) estimate the expected revenue to GPs in a simulation framework using data on the compensation terms of the management contracts for 238 venture capital and buyout funds. Their focus is on understanding how expected revenue breaks down into fixed and variable components, and how it varies with the scalability of the funds'
investments. Their data do not include any ownership or performance information. Their modeling approach, in which LPs "get their money back" and GPs capture the rents associated with their abilities, is consistent with our results.
Our work is also related to the literature studying the cash flow performance of private Finally, our work adds to the literature studying compensation, ownership, and their link to performance in other delegated asset management settings, notably mutual funds and hedge funds. There is a robust negative relation between mutual fund fees and netof-fee performance (e.g. Carhart, 1997; Fama and French, 2010) , in contrast to our results for private equity and consistent with the relative lack of sophistication of retail mutual fund investors (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2011 Daniel, and Naik (2009) find that hedge fund managers with stronger incentive compensation and higher ownership earn higher net returns, suggesting that hedge fund managers do not capture excess returns in the form of higher compensation to the same extent as is true in private equity.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the data. Section III studies the determinants of compensation and ownership terms, both across funds and over time. Section IV relates these terms to the cash flow performance and call and distribution behavior of the funds. Section V concludes.
II. Data and Sample Construction
A. Coverage, Variables, and Sample Selection
Our analysis uses a confidential, proprietary dataset obtained from a large, institutional limited partner with extensive investments in private equity. In total, there are 837 venture capital and buyout funds in our sample, representing almost $600 billion in committed capital spanning vintage years 1984-2009 (Table 1) . The sample comprises a significant fraction of the universe of private equity. We have 34.4% of the Venture Economics (VE) universe of total capital committed to U.S. venture capital and buyout funds, and 55.7% of that committed to U.S. buyout funds, over the same time period.
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For each fund, the data contain fund-level information on the management fees and carried interest that the GPs earn as compensation and the GPs' own investment (capital commitment) in the fund. The GP's capital commitment determines their direct ownership stake in the fund. The data also contain the complete quarterly cash flows (capital calls and distributions) to and from the funds and their limited partners, as well as quarterly estimated (by the GP) market values of unrealized investments. The cash flows are net of all management fees and carried interest, and comprise over 41,000 time-series observations extending through the second quarter of 2010. We also have data on fund size and on each fund's position in its partnership's sequence of funds (sequence number), and we know whether any two funds belong to the same partnership. The data were anonymized before they were provided to us so we do not know the identity of the GPs or the names of the funds.
The dataset comprises the largest and most recent sample of private equity compensation terms in the literature, and is the first available for academic research to include information on GP ownership. The dataset is also the first to combine cash flow information with compensation and ownership data. Another important advantage of the data is that they come directly from the LP's internal accounting system, and so are free from the reporting and survivorship biases that plague commercially available private equity databases (Harris, Jenkinson, and Stucke, 2010) . The data are also at least partially random: the data provider's overall private equity portfolio was assembled over time through a series of mergers that occurred for reasons unrelated to each company's private equity portfolio.
Nevertheless, given that our data come from a single (albeit large) limited partner, the representativeness of the sample is a natural concern. Robinson and Sensoy (2011) compare the data to commercially available databases (VE, Preqin, and Cambridge Associates).
In doing so, they note that assessing representativeness is difficult because the universe of private equity funds is unavailable and because commercial databases provide inconsistent accounts of private equity performance (Metrick and (2007) show that the best-performing VC funds are concentrated among one particular class of LP (endowments), the differences for venture capital likely reflect the GP/LP matching process more than a selection bias per se. Moreover, our cross-sectional analyses are only sensitive to selection issues insofar as any potential bias in the data is correlated in specific ways with the explanatory variables. In any case, our results should be interpreted bearing in mind the caveat that we do not have the universe of private equity funds.
B. Summary Statistics on Fund Characteristics
The characteristics of our sample funds are presented in Table 1 indicates that this is driven by the growing prevalence of large buyout funds in the post-2006 vintage portion of the sample. Table 2 provides summary statistics on GP compensation terms (fixed management fees and performance-sensitive carried interest) and on their own capital commitments to the funds they manage, which in turn determine their ownership stakes in the funds. These terms are all contracted at the beginning of a fund's life, and are not renegotiated during the life of the fund. Summary statistics on these terms are useful in their own right because no prior work has had access to data on GP ownership, and because our sample of compensation terms is both larger and more recent than Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Metrick and Yasuda (2010a).
C. Summary Statistics on General Partner Compensation and Ownership

C.1. Management fees
Panel A presents statistics for the full sample, beginning with management fees. For 82 of our 837 funds, management fees are either unknown or are subject to yearly negotiation rather than being specified in advance. We exclude these funds from the fee statistics and analyses, as do Gompers and Lerner (1999) .
In the management contract, management fees are expressed as a fee percentage and a basis to which the percentage applies. As Panel A of Table 2 shows, almost all funds (92%)
have an initial fee basis of committed capital (i.e., fund size, which is fixed for the life of the fund). The initial percentage fee (the percentage in effect for the first year of the fund's life)
is usually in the range of 1.5% to 2.5%. The average (median) initial fee for VC funds is 2.24% (2.50%), while the figures for buyout funds are lower: 1.78% (2.00%). The fractions of funds with initial management fees equal to 1.5%, 2.0%, and 2.5% are, respectively, 5%, 26%, and 46% for VC funds and 23%, 43%, and 7% for buyout funds.
The contract may stipulate that the percentage and/or basis changes at some point during the life of the fund. These changes almost uniformly result in lower management fees later in the fund's life. In our sample, among funds that have such changes, the basis changes at most once. The basis sometimes changes to "invested capital", the total capital invested in portfolio companies to date. However, the most common basis change is to "net invested capital", defined as invested capital less the (equity) cost basis of all realized investments. The change to net invested capital has the effect that fees are earned only on active, and not on realized, investments. The percentage generally changes at most once as well, but multiple (even annual) changes do sometimes occur. Changes in the fee percentage are likewise almost always a reduction rather than an increase.
Panel A of Table 2 shows that fee percentage and/or basis changes are fairly common in our sample. 45% of funds see their fee percentage change at least once, while 33% have a change in basis. 59% have one type of change or the other (or both), while 18% have both.
Venture capital funds are more likely to have the fee percentage change compared to buyout (55% compared to 38% of funds), while the opposite is true for fee basis changes (12% of VC funds have their fee basis change, compared to 41% of buyout funds).
These complexities suggest that it may not be sufficient to simply compare management fees across funds solely on the basis of their initial fee percentages and bases. Instead, to conduct an apples-to-apples comparison, we use the fee basis and percentage information to forecast the expected (at fund inception) dollar management fee for each year of the fund's expected life (assumed to be 10 years for all funds). We then calculate each fund's "lifetime fees", defined as the undiscounted sum of the expected annual fees. We also calculate the present value (at fund inception) of these lifetime fees by discounting each expected annual fee using the 10-year Treasury bond rate in effect at the fund's inception ("PV lifetime fees").
For the 454 sample funds (60.1%) whose fee basis is committed capital and never changes throughout the life the of the fund, these calculations are straightforward. Expected dollar management fees for each year are obtained by applying the fee percentage in effect for that year to the fund's committed capital (in 257 of these 454 funds, the fee percentage is constant over time as well).
For the 8% of funds whose initial fee basis is not committed capital, and the 33% of funds whose basis changes at some point, assumptions are needed to calculate expected fees for years in which the basis is not committed capital. Following Metrick and Yasuda (2010a), we assume that capital calls for investments are expected to be made over the first 5 years of a fund's life. For VC funds, the expected investment pace is 39%, 18%, 15%, 16%, and 12% in years one through five, respectively. For buyout funds, it is 22%, 22%, 20%, 19%, and 17%. These expected investment paces are equal to the actual empirical size-weighted average investment paces for our sample funds (based on our cash flow data). Again following Metrick and Yasuda (2010a), we assume that investments are exited following an exponential distribution with parameter 0.2 (corresponding to an average five year holding period). Using these assumptions, we forecast the expected invested and net invested capital for each year.
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We then obtain expected annual management fees by applying the percentage fee for each year to the applicable forecasted fee basis for that year. 7 Lifetime fees and their present value then follow immediately.
Panel A of Table 2 Table 1 shows, buyout funds are much larger than VC funds on average, and as a result dollar fees are on average higher in buyout funds. In both types of funds, fixed management fees are a substantial fraction of the total capital committed by
LPs.
Panel B of Table 2 displays the same summary statistics for the sample of liquidated funds. These statistics are similar to those in Panel A.
Overall, while the median initial fee percentage is indeed 2%, consistent with the "2 and 20" conventional wisdom, there is a substantial amount of variation in management fee terms
and expected values, both across and within fund classes.
C.2. Carried Interest
Panel A of Table 2 also shows summary statistics for the carried interest (or carry) of the full sample of funds. The carry specifies the GP's share of the profits earned by the fund. Table 2 shows summary statistics for carried interest for the sample of liquidated funds. These statistics are similar to those in Panel A.
C.3. General Partner Ownership
Finally, Panel A of Table 2 shows summary statistics for the capital commitments of the general partners to their funds. The GP's capital commitment determines its ownership stake in the fund. We present statistics for both ownership stakes (i.e., percentage of fund size owned by the GP) and dollar ownership amounts. These correspond to the most commonly emphasized incentive measures in the CEO literature. GP ownership's impact on the measure emphasized by Jensen and Murphy (1992) , the dollar change in manager wealth per dollar change in investor wealth ($-$ incentives), is measured by the percentage ownership stake.
The impact on Hall and Liebman's (1998) measure, the dollar change in manager wealth per percentage point change in shareholder wealth ($-% incentives), is measured by the dollar ownership amount.
The median GP capital commitment is 1% of fund size, resulting in a 1% ownership stake. 56% of VC funds and 35% of buyout funds have a GP ownership between 0.99% and 1.01%. The average GP ownership is 1.78% for VC funds and a significantly higher 2.38% for buyout funds. 26% (18%) of VC funds and 43% (23%) of buyout funds have GP ownership stakes above 1.01% (below 0.99%).
The difference in fund sizes across VC and buyout causes the difference in GP ownership to be greatly amplified in dollar terms. The average (median) dollar ownership is $2.98 million ($1.07 million) for VC funds and $18.84 million ($3.58 million) for buyout funds.
Once again, the summary statistics for the liquidated sample presented in Panel B are similar to those in Panel A.
Overall, these facts indicate that while it is in some sense standard for general partners to post 1% of total committed capital, a significant fraction of GPs invest smaller or larger stakes in their funds, particularly in buyout funds. Moreover, buyout GPs have higher ownership, in both percentage and dollar terms, than VC GPs. For both types of funds, there is considerably more variation in ownership stakes than in carried interest.
D. Market Conditions and Fund Size
Market conditions in the private equity markets vary considerably during our sample period. Market conditions have a pronounced effect on fund size, as suggested by comparing average fund sizes for the liquidated and full samples in Table 1 . This fact is especially important for our purposes because compensation and ownership terms are typically expressed as a function of fund size, and are themselves closely tied to fund size and market conditions (as we show in detail in the sections below).
To explore the connection between market conditions and fund size more carefully, Table   3 presents cross-sectional fund-level OLS estimates of the relation between fund size and market conditions at the time the fund was raised. The key explanatory variable is the natural logarithm of "Industry Flows", which measures the total market-wide committed capital to the fund's asset class (buyout or VC) in the fund's vintage year. In other words, "Industry Flows" is the total fundraising by all funds of the same type and same vintage year as the focal fund. We construct this measure using data from VE, and not our own data, because we are interested in market-wide fundraising activity.
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In specifications (1)- (3) of Table 3 , the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of fund size, so the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. These specifications show that the average fund size grows significantly when industry fundraising is higher. A 10% change in fundraising volume in a given vintage year results in a 2.7% larger average fund size. The elasticities for VC and buyout do not differ significantly.
Specifications (4)- (6) show that the similar elasticities mask important differences in the sensitivity of fund size to fundraising activity, because of the large differences in average fund size between VC and buyout. In these specifications, the dependent variable is fund size (in $ millions). The estimates indicate that VC fund size grows on average by $0.54 million for a 1% increase in VC fundraising, while the buyout fund size grows on average by an order of magnitude more: $3.40 million for a 1% increase in buyout fundraising. Specifications (7)- (9) investigate the change in dollar fund size for a dollar change in market-wide fundraising.
Again, average dollar fund size in buyout funds is much more sensitive to dollar fundraising than is the case in venture funds. The estimates imply that the average VC fund size grows by $0.21 million for a $ 100 million increase in VC fundraising, compared to an average buyout fund size growth of $1.94 million for the same $100 million increase in buyout fundraising.
These differences between buyout and VC funds in Columns (5) and (6) and in Columns (8) and (9) are all statistically significant.
Overall, the evidence supports the view, recently emphasized by Metrick and Yasuda (2010a) and Chung et al. (2011) , that fund size in venture is naturally more limited by the difficulty of deploying large amounts of capital for early stage firms (i.e., venture is less "scalable" than buyout). 9 While both types of funds grow similarly in percentage terms in response to market conditions, dollar growth in buyout funds during fundraising booms greatly exceeds that of VC funds. As we will see below, scalability arguments also help interpret the compensation patterns we find.
III. The Determinants of General Partner Compensation and Ownership
In this section, we analyze the determinants of general partner management fees, carried interest, and ownership terms. We relate these contractual terms to market conditions and other observable fund characteristics at the time a fund is raised. We then interpret the results in light of contracting theory.
As explanatory variables in our tests, we include the industry fundraising measure from Table 3 , the natural logarithm of "Industry Flows", as well as the size and sequence number of the fund. These explanatory variables are motivated by several considerations. Times of high capital inflows to the private equity industry imply a greater demand for GP services compared to times of low inflows, and may reflect a higher marginal product of GP skill during these times, consistent with the increase in average fund size. If GP talent is in scarce supply, capital inflows will increase GP bargaining power which they may use to obtain higher fractional compensation in addition to higher average fund sizes, especially if lack of scalability limits growth in fund size. In addition, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and others argue that higher-ability GPs are more likely to survive to raise subsequent funds and raise larger funds. Agency theory therefore suggests that compensation may be systematically related to fund size and sequence. Finally, signaling and agency theories suggest that ownership patterns may be systematically related to fund type, size, sequence, or GP bargaining power.
A. Management Fees
We begin with an analysis of management fee terms, reported in Table 4 . In each panel within the table, Columns (1)- (3) consider all funds taken together, Columns (4)-(6) focus on VC funds only, and Columns (7)- (9) report results for buyout funds only.
Columns (3), (6) , and (9) include vintage year fixed effects. These specifications emphasize cross-sectional variation holding market conditions fixed. Panel A examines variation in the initial management fee percentage, which as shown in Table 2 is almost always applied to an initial fee basis of committed capital. Three main patterns emerge from Panel A. Initial fee percentages are positively related to fundraising activity, and negatively related to fund size. The negative relation with fund size is robust to vintage year fixed effects. In addition, buyout funds have lower initial fee percentages than venture funds, consistent with Metrick and Yasuda (2010a). The initial fee percentage is unrelated to the sequence number of the fund.
As shown in Table 2 , for a significant fraction of funds the management contract calls for a change in the fee percentage and/or basis at some point in the fund's life. These changes result in lower fees later in the fund's life. Panel B of Table 4 shows that such provisions are more common during fundraising booms, and also more common in larger funds (the latter result is not quite statistically significant for VC funds). Buyout funds are less likely to have their fees change over time. Once again, there is no relation with sequence number.
Taken together, Panels A and B of Table 4 suggest that during fundraising booms, management fees shift to earlier in the fund's life, with higher initial fees but lower fees later. Such frontloading is intriguing: because interest rates are procyclical, frontloading a given lifetime fee increases its present value to a greater extent in boom times. Panels A and B also show that larger funds have both lower initial fees and are more likely to decrease those fees over time, suggesting a clear tradeoff between fund size and fractional fees.
To assess the joint magnitude of these factors, and to consider whether the higher initial fees in fundraising booms outweigh the associated decline later in the fund's life, Panel C of Table 4 examines variation in the present value of lifetime fees (as defined in Section II).
Several patterns emerge.
The present value of fees as a percentage of fund size is strongly increasing in fundraising activity for both VC and buyout funds, consistent with greater GP bargaining power in booms. Thus, in boom times both fund size and fractional fees increase, so there is a multiplicative positive effect on dollar fees.
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Larger funds have significantly lower fractional fees in present value terms, suggesting that high-ability GPs face a fundamental tradeoff between larger fund size and higher fractional fees. 11 The tradeoff is more pronounced for buyout funds, consistent with scalability arguments. If the size of venture funds is inherently more limited by the constraints of the investment technology, then venture GPs have less scope to trade off fractional fees in exchange for larger funds. 10 Gompers and Lerner (2000) show that capital inflows to venture capital likewise positively affect the valuations of VC portfolio companies. 11 The fact that fund size and fees are jointly determined as a function of the GP's ability does not confound this interpretation. In the absence of any tradeoff, the direct effect of ability on both size and fees should be positive, which by itself would induce a positive correlation between size and fees in the data. Thus, the fact that we cannot observe and control for ability biases us away from finding the negative correlation (tradeoff) that we do.
For VC funds, higher sequence funds have higher fees, but the effect is only marginally statistically significant. This result is the opposite of Gompers and Lerner (1999) , who find that older VC partnerships have lower management fees. Finally, consistent with Panels A and B, buyout funds have lower fees as a percentage of fund size than VC funds. Table 5 analyzes carried interest. As in Table 4 , Columns (1)- (3) consider all funds taken together, Columns (4)-(6) focus on VC funds only, and Columns (7)- (9) report results for buyout funds only. Columns (3), (6) , and (9) VC funds appear to increase their carried interest percentages in fundraising booms, but comparing Columns (4) and (5) shows that this is driven by a size channel. Larger funds receive greater carried interest, and partnerships raise larger funds in fundraising booms.
B. Carried Interest
Column (5) also shows that later sequence VC funds receive higher carry, but the same is not true for buyout funds (Column (8)). Column (6) shows that the cross-sectional relation in VC funds between carried interest and fund size and sequence is virtually unaffected by including vintage year fixed effects. Column (9) shows that fund size is positively related to carried interest in buyout funds as well. The magnitude of the buyout coefficient is about one-third that of venture, and the effect is statistically weaker as well.
Overall, Table 5 shows that carried interest is positively related to fund size (and, for VC funds, fund sequence). As Gompers and Lerner (1999) point out, these relations are consistent with learning models in which LPs allocate more capital to GPs whom they perceive to have greater abilities to generate returns, and with standard agency arguments that higher ability agents require stronger incentives.
Controlling for fund size, carried interest does not move cyclically. Combined with the evidence in Table 4 , these results imply that GP compensation rises and shifts to fixed components during fundraising booms, consistent with greater GP bargaining power during booms and a preference for fixed compensation. Thus, the results suggest that because talented GPs are in scarce supply, capital inflows to private equity result in more favorable GP compensation, even as a fraction of fund size.
The results in Tables 4 and 5 also suggest that compensation terms in VC are both larger as a fraction of fund size and vary with other fund characteristics to a greater extent than is true in buyout funds. This is consistent with scalability arguments whereby size alone can adjust to reflect time variation in the demand for GP services as well as differences in ability across GPs to a greater extent in buyout than is possible in venture. In buyout, higher ability GPs can more easily obtain higher dollar compensation by adjusting fund size, holding fee and carry percentages fixed.
C. General Partner Ownership
The ownership of GPs in the funds they manage may be influenced by a variety of forces.
Signaling arguments, as in Leland and Pyle (1977) , suggest that GP ownership will be higher in funds with less idiosyncratic risk (because projects that are more distinct from the market have lower signaling costs). This suggests that ownership may be higher in buyout funds compared to VC, given the nature of the underlying investments and the fact that the cross-sectional variance of VC fund returns is substantially larger than that of buyout funds Signaling forces also suggest that early funds, particularly first-time funds, would have higher GP ownership to the extent there is greater asymmetry of information about GP ability when the GP has no track record. However, there may be no such relation if information about ability is close to symmetric. The relation between fund size and the GP's percentage ownership is also theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, ownership percentage may be positively related to fund size. This could occur if GPs use ownership to signal effort or ability in an attempt to raise large funds, or if managers of larger funds require stronger incentives because of agency concerns (and if it is important to provide these incentives through ownership in addition to carried interest). On the other hand, if ability is known (symmetric information), higher-ability GPs may be able to both raise larger funds and negotiate lower percentage stakes, which they may prefer for diversification reasons. And wealth constraints may limit ownership percentages as funds grow. Finally, market conditions may also impact ownership terms.
We investigate these ideas in Table 6 . Columns (1)-(3) examine all funds, Columns (4)-(6) focus on VC funds only, and Columns (7)- (9) consider buyout funds only. The only clear pattern from the specifications involving all funds is that buyout GPs have greater ownership than VC GPs, consistent with the need for higher ownership in asset classes with higher idiosyncratic risk. Moving to the type-specific analysis, we see from Columns (4) and (7) that there is no effect of market-wide fundraising conditions on GP ownership. There is some evidence that first-time buyout funds (but not VC funds) signal their effort/ability with higher ownership (Column (7)), but the result becomes just short of statistical significance when vintage year fixed effects are included (Columns (8) and (9)).
Columns (4)- (9) 
D. Summary and Discussion
Overall, the results in Tables 4-6 provide novel evidence on the determinants of managerial compensation and ownership in the private equity industry. Times of high fundraising activity are associated with higher fixed management fees but are unrelated to carried interest or GP ownership terms. Thus, during fundraising booms, GP compensation rises and shifts to fixed components. This in turn implies that the elasticities of GP compensation and wealth to fund performance (percentage change in compensation/wealth for a percentage change in fund performance) decline during boom times.
The analysis also draws a clear picture of how compensation and incentives vary in the cross-section of funds. Carried interest is higher in larger funds, while management fees are lower. These findings imply that the elasticity of GP compensation to performance is higher in larger funds. The results are consistent with the idea that higher-ability GPs raise larger funds and require stronger incentives, and with a trade-off between size and management fees. In buyout funds, ownership patterns reinforce this conclusion. In VC, lower ownership among larger funds dampens the incentive effects of the higher carried interest. These results are consistent with the view of Gompers and Lerner (1999), Axelson, Strömberg, and Weisbach (2009), and others that agency considerations are a key determinant of private equity compensation and the organization of private equity funds more generally.
As discussed in the subsections above, all of these results are potentially consistent with optimal contracting explanations. However, they are potentially consistent with criticisms of private equity compensation and incentives as well. For instance, higher fixed compensation in boom times may result in lower net performance to LPs if contracts are inefficient and GPs are extracting too much. Or, if contracts are efficient, such compensation may simply reflect a higher productivity of GP skills in those times, and the (at least partial) ability of GPs to capture the associated returns, so net performance to LPs need not suffer.
The acid test for the optimal contracting/efficiency view is therefore how compensation and ownership terms relate to the cash flow performance of the funds. We take up this issue in the next section.
IV. Compensation, Ownership, and Cash Flow Performance and Behavior
In this section we first relate compensation and ownership terms to fund cash flow performance, and then explore how these contract terms connect to the cash flow behavior of the funds.
A. Contract Terms and Cash Flow Performance
To relate compensation and ownership terms to performance, we construct two measures of performance. The first is the public market equivalent (PME) pioneered by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) . The PME is calculated by discounting all cash outflows from the fund (distributions) using the total return of the S&P 500 as the discount rate, and summing each discounted outflow to obtain the total discounted outflows from the fund. We similarly calculate the total discounted inflows (capital calls) to the fund. The ratio of the total discounted outflows to the total discounted inflows is the PME. The PME reflects the return (net of all fees and carried interest) of the fund relative to that of the S&P 500. A PME of 1.0 means that the fund exactly matched the performance of the S&P 500 over its life; in other words, a PME of 1.0 means that the LP would have received exactly the same total return had she, instead of investing in the private equity fund, invested all capital calls in the S&P 500. A PME of 1.10 (0.90) means that the LP received 10% more (fewer) dollars from investing in the private equity fund compared to investing in the S&P 500. The PME is therefore a useful measure of performance for LPs who are interested in knowing whether investments in private equity outperform investments in public equities. At the same time, the PME is unlikely to be a measure of the true risk-adjusted returns to private equity funds (whether PME understates or overstates true risk-adjusted returns depends on whether the true beta is less than or greater than one).
Our second measure of performance is a "tailored PME" that is computed in the same way as the regular PME, but using different benchmark indexes (not the S&P 500) depending on the type of fund. For venture funds, we use the Nasdaq composite total return index.
For buyout funds, we group funds according to size terciles and use the corresponding FamaFrench size tercile portfolios as the benchmark (constructed using NYSE size breakpoints at the 30 th and 70 th percentiles) which are available on Ken French's website. (Results are similar using instead the categorization in our data of whether the fund is focused on small, middle, or large buyouts, which is closely related to the actual size of the fund.) In this way, the tailored PMEs help get a closer match compared to the regular PME on variation in systematic risk that is related to the size of private equity portfolio companies, as well as variation that is due to the technology focus of much venture investing. Robinson and Sensoy (2011) provide descriptive information on the distribution of PME and tailored PME in the sample. Table 7 investigates the relations between these performance measures and compensation and ownership terms. It is important to emphasize that these performance measures are net of all management fees and carried interest. Therefore, if GPs with higher compensation are extracting too much, then compensation should be negatively related to net-of-fee performance. Similarly, if low GP ownership inefficient and means that GPs are insufficiently bonded to the funds and have too low a stake in their performance, funds with low GP ownership should perform poorly.
On the other hand, if compensation and ownership reflect optimal contracting, then there are two possibilities. If GPs with higher compensation generate higher gross returns and capture them through that higher compensation, we would expect no relation between compensation terms and net performance. If instead some excess returns are shared with LPs, perhaps because competition among LPs is imperfect, then we would expect compensation to be positively related to net performance. Also, if ownership terms are set efficiently, then low GP ownership funds should not underperform. They may even outperform if highability managers prefer low ownership stakes (for instance, for diversification of their personal portfolios) and are willing to allow LPs to capture some excess returns in exchange for lower required stakes.
Panel A of Table 7 In Panel A, Columns (1)- (3) use PME as the performance measure and include vintage year fixed effects to focus on cross-sectional variation at a point in time. These columns reveal no evidence that higher compensation or lower ownership is associated with worse net performance. If anything, the opposite is true, as buyout fund performance is positively related to carried interest. In addition, low buyout GP ownership is positively associated with performance. The inclusion of vintage year fixed effects means that these columns cannot address whether the higher management fees that occur in funds raised in boom times (Table 4) are associated with worse performance. Accordingly, Columns (4)- (6) drop the fixed effects to allow time-series variation in compensation and ownership terms to influence the estimates. All of the patterns in Columns (1)- (3) are robust. Columns (6)- (12) repeat the analysis using the tailored PME as the performance measure. Once again, all of the patterns are robust. These columns also show that buyout funds do not outperform VC funds in tailored PME terms, even though they do in PME terms (Column (1)). This suggests that the tailored PMEs do a better job capturing differences in systematic risk.
Panel B of Table 7 repeats the analysis for the subsample of liquidated funds. There are two differences compared to Panel A. The first is that the coefficient on carried interest for buyout funds becomes just shy of statistical significance. This change is likely due to the smaller sample size; the coefficient increases in magnitude compared to Panel A, but the standard error grows. The second difference is that in the tailored PME specifications in
Columns (8) and (11), carried interest in VC funds is negatively associated with performance, indicating that carried interest in VC funds may sometimes be excessive.
These conclusions are robust to altering the specifications in Table 7 by omitting controls for fund size and sequence, and to entering each contract term individually.
Overall, the evidence in Table 7 is consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium in which compensation terms reflect agency concerns and the productivity of manager skills, and in which managers with higher compensation earn back their pay by delivering higher gross performance relative to public equity benchmarks. This is true both with respect to higher compensation associated with fundraising booms, and with respect to differences in compensation across GPs at a point in time. 12 In both cases, higher compensation appears to be justified by greater ability to generate gross returns, and indicate that, consistent with arguments that GP services are the scarce resource (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005 ), the GP is largely able to capture the associated excess returns.
B. Contract Terms and Cash Flow Behavior
It is possible that the analyses of the relations between contract terms and performance miss important differences in the systematic riskiness of the funds that are related to contract terms. In particular, funds with higher compensation may have higher betas, and this could potentially explain why these funds have higher gross returns relative to public equity benchmarks. Presumably, LPs would prefer for higher compensation and incentives to translate into more effort to add value (i.e., generate alpha), or be more reflective of the ability to do so, as opposed to simply translating into greater systematic risk-taking. These However, the behavior of cash flows to and from limited partners allows us to offer some insights into these questions. Holding the magnitude of calls and distributions constant, a fund that is more likely to call capital in bad times and distribute capital in good times will have a higher covariance of cash flow returns with the market return compared to a fund whose call and distribution behavior is unrelated to broader market conditions.
13
Consequently, we can check whether funds with higher compensation or lower ownership are 12 These results are also consistent with Robinson and Sensoy's (2011) finding that while funds raised in boom times underperform in absolute (IRR or TVPI) terms, they do not underperform in relative terms (PME), due to the co-cyclicality of public and private equity markets. 13 Put differently, a systematic tendency to call capital in bad times when it is costly for LPs to provide it, and to distribute capital in good times when it is less valuable because other investments are paying off as well, suggests greater systematic riskiness from an LP's perspective.
likely to be taking on greater systematic risk by asking whether the comovement of their calls and distributions with public market conditions is a function of contractual terms.
The analysis is presented in Table 8 . The unit of observation is a fund-calendar quarter.
All specifications include fund type, fund age, and vintage year fixed effects, to control for differing unconditional propensities to call capital across funds of different types, ages, and vintage years. The main explanatory variable of interest is "ln(P/D)", the natural logarithm of the Price/Dividend ratio on the S&P 500 (from Robert Shiller's website), which captures public market valuation levels. We also include the log of the treasury-eurodollar (TED) spread (from Bloomberg) to assess sensitivity to liquidity conditions unrelated to market valuations. We also control for the fund's uncalled capital as a percentage of its committed capital, a measure of a fund's dry powder. All of these explanatory variables are lagged one quarter, so these are predictive regressions. (2) and (5) with the carried interest percentage, and Columns (3) and (6) with GP percentage ownership. We also include the respective contract terms as explanatory variables themselves. This assures that we account for any differences in the magnitude of cash flows that are associated with the contract terms. In other words, the specifications hold the magnitude of cash flows fixed across the contract terms of interest. We include all cash flow observations. Conclusions are unaffected by restricting the call specifications to observations where the fund has some uncalled capital, and restricting the distribution specifications to observations for which some capital has previously been called.
The results are easy to summarize. There is no evidence that any contract term is associated with both a lower sensitivity of capital calls to P/D (which would indicate a greater propensity to call capital in bad times) coupled with a greater sensitivity of distributions to P/D. Nor is there any evidence that any contract term is systematically associated with a greater propensity to call capital when liquidity is tight (TED is high) and a to distribute when liquidity improves.
Overall, then, the results suggest that it is unlikely that private equity funds with higher compensation earn back their fees by taking more systematic risk. This is true even with respect to the carried interest that one might worry would create systematic risk-taking (as opposed to effort-providing) incentives. Instead, the evidence is more consistent with the interpretation that managers of such funds add more value.
V. Conclusion
This paper uses a large, proprietary database of private equity funds, comprising almost 40% of the U.S. Venture Economics universe from 1984-2010, to study the links between the terms of private equity management contracts and the subsequent cash flow behavior and performance of the funds. The database is the largest and most recent source of private equity compensation terms available to date, and is the first to provide information on manager ownership and to include cash flow information along with the terms of management contract.
We use these data to contrast two views of the state of managerial compensation practices in private equity. The first is that highly compensated GPs, or those with little skin in the game, extract excessive rents and have inadequate incentives, which ultimately spells poor returns for limited partners. The second view is that the management contracts we observe reflect bargaining outcomes between sophisticated parties, and that management contracts reflect the productivity of GP skills and the agency problems that LPs face.
The evidence in this paper clearly supports the latter view. To be sure, during fundraising booms, percentage management fees increase and the fixed/variable mix of GP compensation shifts toward the fixed component, consistent with greater GP bargaining power and a preference for fixed compensation. However, management fees and carried interest are generally unrelated to net-of-fee cash flow performance, suggesting that private equity GPs that receive higher compensation earn it in the form of higher gross returns. We also find no evidence that low GP ownership translates into lower returns, indeed for buyout funds the opposite is true.
Our results stand in marked contrast to what is known about the mutual fund industry.
There, net-of-fee performance is strongly negatively correlated with management fees. Of course, limited partners who invest in private equity are different from mutual fund investors in two important respects. First, because they are typically large institutions committing large sums of capital, they presumably possess better monitoring and oversight technologies than do retail investors. But perhaps more importantly, the inability to withdraw their commitments without incurring substantial costs creates much stronger incentives to screen GPs ex ante and to guarantee that management contracts optimally reflect their agency concerns. In this regard, private equity investors also differ from investors in hedge funds, who are able to withdraw their capital periodically, with advance notice given to the fund.
Our results suggest that understanding how monitoring, oversight and the matching process between LPs and GPs affect the equilibrium effort and performance of intermediated capital is an important question for future research. Robinson and Sensoy (2011) . Fraction of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd funds indicates the fraction of sample funds of that sequence number (position in a partnership's sequence of funds). Total Committed Capital is the aggregate amount of capital committed to our sample funds (i.e. the sum of the sizes of all sample funds). Total LP Capital and Total GP Capital indicate, respectively, the contributions of limited partners and general partners to this total. The % of VE universe is the total committed capital of the sample funds of a given fund type expressed as a percentage of the total committed capital to all funds of the same type reported on Venture Economics over the entire 1984-2009 sample period. The % of VE U.S. universe includes only U.S. funds. Fund Size is the committed capital of the fund. All dollar amounts are in millions of US dollars. Funds in the liquidated sample are those that had vintage years prior to 2006 and were liquidated as of 6/30/2010. (1)- (3), the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of fund size (in $M). In specifications (4)- (9), the dependent variable is fund size (in $M). Industry Flows is total capital committed to all funds of the same type (venture capital or buyout) raised in the fund's vintage year (data from Venture Economics). Coefficients on ln(Industry Flows) in specifications (4)- (6) are premultiplied by 0.01 so they have the interpretation as the $M change in fund size for a 1% change in ln(Industry Flows). Coefficients on Industry Flows in specifications (7)- (9) are premultiplied by 100 so they have the interpretation as the $M change in fund size for a $100 M change in Industry Flows. Buyout Fund is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is a buyout fund, and zero otherwise. A constant is estimated in each specification but not reported. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by vintage year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table presents cross-sectional fund-level OLS estimates of the relations between general partner management fees and other fund characteristics. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the initial management fee in percent per year (i.e., the percentage fee for the first year of the fund's life). In Panel B, the dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the management fee percentage or the basis to which is applies ever change over the fund's life. In Panel C, the dependent variable is the present value of the lifetime management fees for the fund, expressed as a percentage of fund size (committed capital). These dependent variables are defined and summary statistics are provided in Table 2 . ln(Fund No.) is the natural logarithm of the fund's sequence number (its position in a partnership's sequence of funds). All other variables are defined in previous tables. Vintage year fixed effects are included in Columns (3), (6) , and (9) This table presents cross-sectional fund-level OLS estimates of the relations between final fund performance, net of all management fees and carried interest, and the terms of the fund management contract. In specifications (1)-(6), the dependent variable is the fund's final PME with respect to the S&P 500. In specifications (7)- (12), the dependent variable is the fund's final PME with respect to its tailored index. The tailored index is the Nasdaq for VC funds, and the Fama-French small, medium, and large size-tercile portfolios for small, medium, and large buyout funds, respectively. "GP Ownership High" and "GP Ownership Low" are indicator variables for whether the GP commitment is greater than 1.01% of fund size or less than 0.99% of fund size, respectively. All other variables are defined in previous tables. PV Lifetime Fees is dummied out for funds without management fee information or without pre-specified fees. The dummy variable is insignificant and not reported. Panel A uses the full sample, while Panel B uses only the sample of liquidated funds. Specifications (1)- (3) and (7)- (9) include vintage year fixed effects. A constant is estimated in each specification but not reported. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the partnership level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Full Sample
Dependent Variable:
Columns (1)-(6): PME Columns (7)- (12): Tailored PME Columns (1)-(6): PME Columns (7)- (12): Tailored PME (1)- (3) is the natural logarithm of one plus the capital call amount in that quarter as a percentage of the fund's committed capital ("Capital Calls"). In specifications (4)-(6), the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the distribution amount in that quarter as a percentage of the fund's committed capital ("Distributions"). In specifications (1) and (4), the contract term analyzed is the present value of lifetime fees (as a percentage of fund size). In specifications (2) and (5), the contract term is the carried interest percentage, and in specifications (4) and (6) it is the GP's ownership percentage. All of these variables are demeaned in each specification. Estimation of all specifications is by Tobit to account for left-censoring when no capital call or distribution occurs. All specifications include fixed effects for fund age (measured in quarters). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by calendar quarter. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
